



# FAIR Overview



# Bernadette “Bernie” Dunn (She/Her/Hers)

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Trainer, RiskLens Academy ([bdunn@risklens.com](mailto:bdunn@risklens.com))



- Risk Management Experience in Healthcare, Financial Services, U.S. Federal Government, and Technology & Digital Services
- Developer of Enterprise Risk Management Software Platform Training
- 15 Years Enterprise Software Solutions Executive
- Certified OpenFAIR Trainer, RiskLens
- B.A., Organizational Communications, University of Cincinnati, 2001
- Certificate of Mastery, Rhetorical Theory, University of Cincinnati, 2001
- Certified Leadership Development Coach and Trainer, Next Level Trainings (2015) Deep Coaching Institute (2018)
- DEI Advocate & Co-Chair, RiskLens Diversity Empowerment Council

1. The **Communication** Challenge
2. Moving from **Qualitative** to **Quantitative Risk Management**
3. **FAIR** Risk Model and Importance of Consistent **Terminology**
4. **RiskLens Platform**: Our **Next Steps** Moving Forward
5. Questions

# The Communication Challenge

CFO

"How much risk do we have?  
Are we spending too little or  
too much on mitigation?"

AUDIT

"Did you fix those  
high priority  
issues?"

BOARD/CEO

"We don't want to be the next news  
headline cybercrime victims. Are  
we doing enough to minimize risk?"

CIO

"Are we spending our cybersecurity  
budget on the right things? What is  
the ROI?"

CISO

"Έχουμε πάνω από  
δέκα χιλιάδες  
τρωτά σημεία ,  
είναι συμβατό  
με το ογδόντα  
τοίς εκατό"

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# Qualitative vs. Quantitative Measurement Methods





# Risk Management Evolution

**Fear,  
Uncertainty &  
Doubt**



**Compliance  
Checklists/  
Maturity  
Models**



**Qualitative  
Impact  
Assessments**



**Quantitative  
Risk Analysis**

# Subjectivity

Verbal descriptions of probability and impact may not be interpreted equally

Translate each label into a probability



- Certain = 100%
- Highly likely =
- Probable =
- Unlikely =
- Extremely unlikely =

“Not only are [such] probabilistic terms subjective, but they also can have widely different interpretations. One person’s “pretty likely” is another’s “far from certain”

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-Andrew and Michael Mauboussin  
*data scientist at Twitter; professor at Columbia Business School, respectively*  
*authors of the cited HBR article*

# Subjectivity (continued)



Source: Harvard Business Review



# Impact/Likelihood Range Compression

When you break a continuous scale into discrete buckets you lose fidelity and decrease the ability to make meaningful comparisons.

Scenario	Est. Prob.	Est. Impact	Expected Value	Prob. Rating	Impact Rating	Risk Score
A	15%	\$500,000	\$75,000	2	3	6
B	20%	\$800,000	\$160,000	2	3	6

This problem is even worse when “High Impact” means  $> \$x$ .

# Flaws with Implying Certainty

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- Assigning a **single value** doesn't allow for expression of uncertainty
- **"Supply chain disruption"** could last an hour, a day, 8 months...
- We need a forecasting method that shows us a **range of probable outcomes**

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**Traditional methods have logical flaws, which prevent us from answering some important risk-based questions.**



# Unanswerable Questions

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- **How much** money might we lose from this event over the next year?
- **How much** risk do we face across the department/business/enterprise?
- **Should we invest in this new control? Is the risk reduction worth the cost?**

# Quantitative Approach to Risk Management

Instead of this...

Medium Likelihood	High
Scenario A	High Impact


  

Medium Likelihood	High
Scenario B	High Impact


*"We need to prioritize **multiple scenarios** for remediation because we're currently at high risk of experiencing a data breach. They are both rated **high** since the likelihood is medium and the impact is high."*

We could have this:

**\*FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY\***





Top Risks



Cost Benefit


**FAIR enables cost-benefit analysis and effective prioritization of risks in financial terms**

# Prior to FAIR, answers looked like this:





# RiskLens Reports by Role



## Cyber Risk Analyst

Deliver Accurate and Defensible Cyber Risk Assessments


Scenario Details

Scenario	Asset	Threat	Threat Type	Loss Effect	Minimum	100%	Most Likely	Average	90%	Maximum	Score
Core Financial System - FI - Error - Availability	Core Platform	Privileged Incident	Error	Loss of Availability	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$750.4K	\$750.4K	\$0.75	5
Corporate Email - FI - Error - Confidentiality	CRM Network Exchange	Privileged Incident	Error	Loss of Confidentiality	\$0.0K	\$15.2K	\$1.0K	\$800.2K	\$1.0K	\$0.0K	5
ERP System - Availability - External Actor	Database	External Actor	Malicious	Loss of Confidentiality	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$80	\$0	\$110.6M	5
Human Resource System - FI - Error - Info	Application	Privileged Incident	Error	Loss of Integrity	\$0	\$3.7K	\$4.9K	\$0.3K	\$11.2K	\$17.0K	5
Internal Facing App - External Actor - Conf.	Application	External Actor	Malicious	Loss of Confidentiality	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1.7K	\$80	\$22.2M	5
Key Financial Platform - External Actor - Info	Core Platform	External Actor	Malicious	Loss of Integrity	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$44.7K	\$0	\$0.0K	5
Key Financial System - Malicious FI - Internal Core Platform	Privileged Incident	Malicious	Loss of Integrity	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$82.2K	\$24.0K	\$1K	5	
Shared Drive - External Actor - Restore	Shared Drive	External Actor	Malicious	Loss of Availability	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$44.9K	\$0	\$0.0K	5
Unauthorized Data - External Actor - Conf.	Shared Drive	External Actor	Malicious	Loss of Confidentiality	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$85K	\$100.0K	\$2.5K	5
Workstation - External Actor - Malware - A	Workstation	External Actor	Malicious	Loss of Availability	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$100K	\$200.0K	\$3.8K	5



## CRO

Build a Highly Effective Cyber Risk Management Program



## CISO

Manage Cybersecurity from the Business Perspective

**Q1 HIPAA**  
Increases cost by \$500K, reduces average risk by \$750.4M  
Reduces average risk by 57.59%


**Q1 HIPAA**  
-\$750.4M (-57.59%)  
Reduces risk the most

**Q2 HIPAA**  
No change in risk



## Board and Business Executives

Understand the Financial Impact of Cyber Risk



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# The FAIR Risk Model & Terminology



# Definitions of Risk

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Dictionary: “a **situation** involving exposure to danger”

COSO ERM: “the **possibility** that events will occur and affect the achievement of objectives”

ISO Guide 73: “the **effect** of uncertainty **on objectives**”

NIST-CSF: “a **measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened** by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a function of the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs and the likelihood of occurrence.”

IRM: “the **combination** of the probability of an event and its consequences”

# FAIR's Definition: RISK

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FAIR defines risk as a measurement of the probable **frequency** and probable **magnitude** of future loss.

Risk is expressed quantitatively, in amounts of future loss and their probabilities over a given timeframe. (Almost always **over the next year**)

**RISK  
FORECASTED ALE**  
(ANNUALIZED LOSS EXPOSURE)


=

**LOSS EVENT  
FREQUENCY  
# OF TIMES**

x

**LOSS MAGNITUDE  
\$\$\$/EVENT**

# Which of these are risks?



Typical Top 10 Technology Risk List

**NONE!**



# The FAIR Model


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## Factor Analysis of Information Risk

A model and method for **defensible quantitative analysis** of risk that produces results in **financial and probabilistic terms**, enabling **cost-effective management** of risk across the organization/enterprise.



# FAIR: A Standard Risk Analytics Model



Accredited as an  
Industry Standard by



Complementary to  
Risk Frameworks



**NIST**


Supported by a Fast  
Growing Community



Wide Industry Adoption  
30% Fortune 1000




FAIR Book Inducted  
in Cybersecurity Canon



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# Here's How Loss Unfolds

## Loss Event



Anything, actor or agent, capable of acting against an asset in a manner that can result in loss


Anything of value that can be affected in a manner that results in loss

How loss materializes within a given asset

**Risk =** A measurement of the **probable frequency** and the **probable magnitude** of future loss.

# Risk Scoping Scenario Example


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How much risk do we face from **cybercriminals** breaching the **confidentiality** of sensitive data (**PII**) in **Database X**


# How Will This Loss Unfold?

**Scenario:** Breach of PII from Database X by External Malicious Actor



# Where Controls Map to FAIR

In FAIR, controls are used to **reduce the frequency** of an event happening or **reduce the loss magnitude** once the loss event happens.



# Six Forms of Loss

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## Productivity

Reduction in an organization's ability to generate its primary value proposition (producing goods or services, etc.)

## Response

Expenses associated with managing or responding to a loss event

## Replacement

Capital expense associated with replacing or repairing lost or damaged assets

## Competitive Advantage

Losses associated with competitors obtaining and using trade secrets


## Fines and Judgments

Losses from legal or regulatory actions levied against an organization through civil, criminal, or contractual actions.

## Reputation

Losses associated with an external perception that an organization's value, competency, or ethics have diminished.





# Data Collection and Probable Estimation



# Measurement Concepts

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Knowing or stating the probability of an outcome or event does not = a prediction.



**Probability  
vs.  
Prediction**

Anything is possible, especially on a long enough timeline. Focusing on time-bound probabilities will help inform decisions.



**Possibility  
vs.  
Probability**

Not binary concepts, they exist on a spectrum. Goal: *drive toward objectivity in analyses* with an external frame of reference.



**Subjectivity  
vs.  
Objectivity**


Accuracy is King. Goal: *accuracy* (i.e. correctness) with a useful degree of precision.



**Accuracy  
vs.  
Precision**


# Measuring Risk Refresher

## The FAIR Model



## Probability Distributions

Estimates in FAIR analysis are expressed using [probability distributions](#).



## Calibration Estimation

Measurement technique that produces [accurate ranges](#) with a [useful degree of precision](#)

### Calibrated Estimation Process:

1. Start with an **absurd** range
2. Eliminate **highly unlikely** values
3. Reference **what you know** to narrow the range further
4. Play a **calibration game** (equivalent bet test)



The goal is to **calibrate** all estimates to **90% confidence intervals**.

When it's too hard for you to choose between the range and the spinner, you've found your calibrated estimate.




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# Probability Distributions

Estimates in FAIR analysis are expressed using probability distributions.



## 4-PART ESTIMATES

- Minimum Probable Value
- Maximum Probable Value
- Most Likely Value (MLV)
- Confidence Level MLV is more probable than other values in the range

# Calibration Estimation

Measurement technique that produces **accurate ranges** with a **useful degree of precision**


## Calibrated Estimation Process:

1. Start with an **absurd** range
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3. Reference **what you know** to narrow the range further
4. Play a **calibration** game (equivalent bet test)

The goal is to *calibrate* all estimates to **90% confidence intervals**.

When it's too hard for you to choose between the range and the spinner, you've found your calibrated estimate.

10% chance you lose!




**90% chance you win!**

# Monte Carlo Simulations

- “Monte Carlo simulations perform repeated random sampling to obtain numerical results. The output of Monte Carlo simulations used in risk analysis is shown as probability distributions. **The primary advantage of using Monte Carlo simulations in risk analysis is the ability of the method to perform thousands of calculations on random samples, allowing risk analysts to create a more accurate and defensible depiction of probability given the uncertainty of the inputs.**”


*OpenFAIR Standard*




<https://roh.engineering>



# QA The FAIR Factors After Results




## RESULTS



Monte Carlo allows us to **account for uncertainty** and see the **relative probabilities of different outcomes**


# FAIR-Based Risk Analysis Process



2

Input Data

# The FAIR Model – Frequency Side



Start at the top where you have the best available data, then provide calibrated 4-part estimates.

# Controls Mapping to FAIR




In FAIR, controls are used to **reduce the frequency** of an event happening (or reduce the loss magnitude once the loss event happens).

Types of Controls for Frequency:

- Avoidance
- Deterrence
- Resistance

# How Will This Loss Unfold?

**Scenario:** Breach of PII from Database X by External Actor




2

Input Data

# The FAIR Model – Loss Magnitude Side

How much will we lose each time this  
“loss event scenario” happens?  
\*SIX FORMS OF LOSS\*




# Controls Mapping to FAIR Continued

In FAIR, controls are used to **reduce the frequency** of an event happening or **reduce the loss magnitude** once the loss event happens.


Type of Control for Loss Magnitude:

- Responsive



# How Can Loss Magnitude Be Reduced?

**Scenario:** Breach of PII from Database X by External Actor






3

QA

# Results

- For single-scenario analyses, focus on **two sets of results**:



**Loss Exceedance Curves** show what % of simulations met or exceeded a given amount of loss in the simulated year.

## Summary of Simulation Results

The following tables summarize the simulation of workshop inputs before the platform calculates annualized loss exposure (ALE). Use these to troubleshoot the workshop, but not for ALE calculation.

### Primary Loss Event Frequency

Minimum	0.922
Most Likely	2.225
Average	2.238
Maximum	3.54

### Primary Loss Magnitude

Minimum	\$143.6K
Most Likely	\$211.5K
Average	\$208K
Maximum	\$271.5K

### Secondary Loss Event Probability

Minimum	0%
Most Likely	0%
Average	0%
Maximum	0%


### Secondary Loss Magnitude

Minimum	\$0
Most Likely	\$0
Average	\$0
Maximum	\$0

Summary of Simulation Results shows the **probable frequencies** and **probable magnitudes** of primary and secondary loss events.

# Report the Results to the Stakeholder

- RiskLens provides out-of-the-platform “risk statements” to support translating the results to stakeholders.
- Which statement(s) would your stakeholder want to hear when reporting how much risk for a specific scenario?
- RiskLens provides additional reports for risk assessments.



# Single Scenario Reporting

- How often are you reporting on a single scenario?
- What do you do next?
- What is really being asked of you as it relates to translating “How much risk do we have?”
- FAIR gets you started, RiskLens completes the process for Risk Assessments.



4

## Report

## RiskLens Top Risk Report

## Top Risks Report



\$1.4M

Most Severe  
Event

10.47%

Highest Probability to  
Exceed \$1M

\$593.6K

Top Annualized  
Risk

## Top Risks - Average Per Event Loss Magnitude

MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Pri...	<div></div>	\$1.4M
MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Ext...	<div></div>	\$1.4M
MTB - Online Banking System Outa...	<div></div>	\$208.1K

## Top Risks - Probability of Annualized Loss Exceeding \$1M

MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Ext...	<div></div>	10.47%
MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Pri...	<div></div>	8.88%
MTB - Online Banking System Outa...	<div></div>	0.84%

## Top Risks - Average Annualized Loss Exposure

MTB - Online Banking System Outa...	<div></div>	\$593.6K
MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Ext...	<div></div>	\$250.5K
MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Pri...	<div></div>	\$212K

## Scenario Details

Scenario	Asset	Threat	Threat Type	Loss Effect	Minimum	10th %	Most Likely	Average	90th %	Maximum	State
MTB - Insurance Payer Breach External A...	MTB - Insurance Payer Data...	External Actor(s)	Malicious	Loss of Confidentiality	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$250.5K	\$1.1M	\$5.7M	C
MTB - Insurance Payer Breach Privileged...	MTB - Insurance Payer Data...	Privileged Inside...	Malicious	Loss of Confidentiality	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$212K	\$830.7K	\$5.4M	C
MTB - Online Banking System Outage Pri...	MTB - Online Banking System	Privileged Inside...	Error	Loss of Availability	\$154.2K	\$385.1K	\$645.8K	\$593.6K	\$828.4K	\$1.3M	C

# RiskLens Cost Benefit Analysis Report



## Encryption

Increases cost by \$500K, reduces average risk by \$424.8K

Reduces average risk by 40.23%

## Network Segmentation

-\$209K (-19.79%)


## Encryption

-\$424.8K (-40.23%)

Reduces risk the most

### Comparison Results

Comparison by Average Annualized Loss Exposure



### Analyses

Baseline Analysis						
	Minimum	10th %	Most Likely	Average	90th %	Maximum
Analysis Results	\$154.2K	\$404.9K	\$643.6K	\$1.1M	\$2.4M	\$8.6M

Network Segmentation						
	Minimum	10th %	Most Likely	Average	90th %	Maximum
Analysis Results	\$154.2K	\$395.7K	\$643.6K	\$847K	\$1.7M	\$7.6M
Increase Or Reduction	\$0	-\$9.2K	\$63	-\$209K	-\$757.4K	-\$1M
Cost-Benefit Summary	\$0	\$0	\$0	-\$10	-\$38	-\$50

Encryption						
	Minimum	10th %	Most Likely	Average	90th %	Maximum
Analysis Results	\$162.7K	\$396.7K	\$645.3K	\$631.2K	\$863K	\$5.9M
Increase Or Reduction	\$8.6K	-\$8.2K	\$1.8K	-\$424.8K	-\$1.6M	-\$2.7M
Cost-Benefit Summary	\$0	\$0	\$0	-\$1	-\$3	-\$5

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# Thank you! Questions?



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# Next Steps with the RiskLens Platform



# RiskLens Platform

