


Common Use Cases for FAIR Analyses





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Work

- Quant risk team at Netflix (*opinions are my own*)
- IT & InfoSec: 20+ years; technology risk for 11
- On the board of the Society of Information Risk Analysts (SIRA) and co-Chair of the SF Bay Chapter of the FAIR Institute

Walk-On Song

- "Problem Child" by AC/DC

Something you don't know about me

- I've swum from Alcatraz to San Francisco 10 times

Agenda

Where do I get my data?

- Quantitative versus qualitative data
- Subjective versus objective data
- Gathering external data
- Gathering internal data
- Utilizing SME estimates

Common use cases

- FAIR and risk appetite / tolerance
- FAIR for optimized risk mitigation
- FAIR for insurance analysis
- FAIR to... increase risk?

Q&A





Where do I get
my data?



“It is a capital mistake
to theorize before
one has data.”

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (Sherlock
Holmes)



Qualitative –vs- Quantitative

Qualitative

- Descriptive
- Adjectives
- Arbitrary rankings
- Opinions, feelings

Examples:

- High, medium, low
- Red, yellow, green
- Fast, not fast, slow

Quantitative

- Numerical data
- Counting
- Ratios
- Measurements

Examples:

- 3 chairs at the table
- He's between 5' and 5' 6" tall
- It rained 5 times in SF last month

Subjective –vs- Objective

Subjective

- Personal opinions
- Feelings
- Judgement

Examples:

- That risk feels high
- Incidents will increase by 10% next year

Objective

- Observations
- Measurements


Examples:

- It's 70- degrees today
- We had one reportable data breach last year

Objective,
subjective,
quantitative,
qualitative

| | Qualitative Data | Quantitative |
|-------------------|--|--|
| Subjective | High, medium low Interviews Reports that describe a risk | Expert estimation of future incident counts Ponemon Cost of a Data Breach Report |
| Objective | Incident reports Grouping data with adjective (e.g fastest car in a race) | Incident counts How much an incident cost Verizon DBIR & Cyentia IRIS 2020 |

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
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Good
Zone

Where we get our data






External Research

Some External Research Sources

Journal / Academic papers



Where to find

- [Sci Hub](#)
- [Directory of Open Access Journals](#)
- [Science Open](#)



How to Use

- Mostly techniques, research on risk
- Some trends on emerging risk or impact studies



Pro Tip

- If you feel stuck on a concept, look at how other disciplines have solved the same problem – information / cyber risk is not unique

Some External Research Sources

SEC Filings



Where to find

- [SEC's EDGAR search](#), or
- Company's website



How to Use

- Public companies are required to file a 10-K annual report with the SEC; usually contain a treasure trove of information following a data breach or major incident
- Find a company that had a similar incident that you are assessing risk for. Look for a 10-K for the following year.



Pro Tip

- Companies will usually disclose how are are responding to an incident, sometimes with costs, and can help informs the magnitude portion of an assessment

Some External Research Sources

Vendor Research / Whitepapers



Where to find

- Company websites and the [Cyentia Research Library](#)

How to Use



- Good to reference for trends, emerging risks and incidents at other companies.
- Can help you separate out probable from improbable ([Verizon DBIR](#))
- [Cyentia IRIS 2020](#) and [Kenna's EPSS calculator](#) are good for risk analysis



Pro Tip

- Some of the very best and the very worst research comes from vendors
- Beware survey based research

Some External Research Sources

Lists of Incidents



Where to find

- [ID Theft Center lists](#)
- [Raw DBIR data aka VERIS](#)
- [Privacy Rights Clearing House](#) (gone dark?)



How to Use

- Peruse how incidents have unfolded at other companies
- Slice and dice your own data – by sector, technique, effect, actor, etc



Pro Tip

- Under a specific incident definition, there's an almost complete incident list
- Can use sampling to determine probability

A photograph of a forest landscape. In the foreground, there is a large pile of cut logs on a dark, gravelly surface. The logs are stacked in several rows, with some showing the light-colored wood and others showing the dark bark. In the background, a calm lake reflects the sky, surrounded by green grass and forested hills. The sky is overcast. A green circle is overlaid on the left side of the image, containing the text "Internal Data".

Internal
Data

Some Internal Data Sources

Internal Incidents



Where to find

- Incident responder teams



How to Use

- Ask for access to incident tickets (e.g. JIRA)
- Look for patterns of incidents, threats, assets, etc.

Pro Tip



- May be able to directly use for forecasts - if we have 10 years of consistent incident reporting and there has been 2 ransomware incidents, it's reasonable to say that there's 1 every 5 years or 20% probability

Some Internal Data Sources

Other



Where to find

- Event logs, system telemetry, vuln scans, pen tests



How to Use

- Most useful in the scoping and scenario building process

Pro Tip



- Don't get bogged down when easier data sources are sufficient



Subject
Matter
Experts

Subject Matter Experts

Expert Judgement



Where to find

- Subject matter experts within your company;



How to Use

- Interview SMEs in structured or unstructured settings to collect probability and magnitude estimates.

Pro Tips



- Excellent supplement to missing, incomplete or expensive data
- Use in analysis that require conjecture, hypothetical questions
- Subject to bias

Bringing it all
together



Gather relevant external
research on probability
and magnitude



Gather relevant internal
incidents and costs



Hand research to SME's

Please read the 2-pager summarizing research on threat actors and control effectiveness and similar incidents at our competitors and companies of a similar technology stack.

I've also collected 5 years of past incidents and their associated costs.

Please provide a range of incident frequency and range of costs. This is a forecast of the next year, considering everything you know about past incidents, our control environment, threats and our response.

Uses cases for FAIR



What kinds of analyses can I perform?

**FAIR unlocks many more decisions
over qualitative risk**



Typical qualitative risk register

| Risk Description | Likelihood | Impact | Risk |
|--|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Weak admin password on SQL server | High | High | High |
| 30 Windows servers out of patch compliance | Medium | High | High |
| Data breach | Very High | Very High | Very High |
| Server room lock is broken | Low | High | Medium |

Decisions with FAIR analysis

Risk ranking / prioritization

- List of projects; which one to do first?

Insurance analysis

- What are the gaps in my cyber insurance coverage?
- Should I self-insure against this risk?

Add or remove a control

- Measure the baseline of risk
- Measure forecasted risk after changing a control

Project ROI

- How much does this project cost?
- If/when implemented, by how much will risk exposure change?

Emerging risk analysis

- Oddball, exotic risks that keeps someone up at night

M&A activity

- Changes in overall risk if a company acquires a company (third-party, data breach)

FAIR and Risk Tolerance




Managing Risk on the Loss Exceedance Curve

Uses a numerical range to articulate risk tolerance

Allows deeper conversations about risk


Management can decide where on the curve to manage to




Managing Risk on the Loss Exceedance Curve

Risk adverse orgs: may want to manage a wide range of outcomes; can't won't tolerate losses \geq \$10m

Risk seeking orgs: hold into capital for other projects; focus on mitigating extreme losses




Using FAIR for optimized risk mitigation



Risk Mitigation

3 risk analyses

- Baseline of current risk
- Projected risk reduction with DLP
- Projected risk reduction with employee checks & training




Risk Mitigation

“Where will our money go?”

Tired: “It will move a red to a green...”

Wired: \$1m in investment buys down \$45m in risk



A magnifying glass is positioned over a bar chart. The chart has a light blue background with a grid. The x-axis is labeled with 'Q1', 'Q2', 'Q3', and 'Q4'. The y-axis has a label '1,000'. There are two data series: blue bars and green bars. The blue bars are consistently taller than the green bars. The magnifying glass is centered over the Q2 and Q3 bars, making them appear larger and more detailed. The text 'FAIR for insurance analysis' is overlaid in white, centered horizontally across the image.

FAIR for insurance analysis

Misconception that all
loss forms are covered

Funny Math

\$80m in data breach risk
- \$50m cyber insurance

\$30m residual risk


Risk Transfer Gap Analysis

Example: SaaS outage | MSA covers \$100k

| Form of Loss | Loss | Current Risk | Coverage |
|-----------------------|--|---------------|----------|
| Productivity | Lost revenue | \$2m - \$5m | |
| | Lost wages | N/A | |
| Response | Incident response team | \$40k-100k | \$20k |
| | Forensics | \$250k-\$350k | |
| | Management meetings | \$100k-\$200k | |
| | Customer notification | N/A | |
| | Credit monitoring | N/A | |
| Replacement | Repair/replace capital assets | N/A | \$20k |
| Competitive Advantage | Loss of intellectual property | N/A | |
| | Loss of trade secrets | N/A | |
| | Loss of merger and acquisition information | N/A | |
| | Loss of market conditions information | N/A | |
| Fines and Judgment | Regulatory fines | N/A | |
| | Class action lawsuits | N/A | |
| | Bail | N/A | |
| Reputation | Reduced market share (lost customers) | N/A | |
| | Decreased projected sales growth | N/A | |
| | Reduced stock price | N/A | |
| | Increased cost of capital | N/A | |


Open your insurance policy or master service agreement

Line by line, determine if a loss is covered



FAIR to... increase
risk?

Increase risk: example



The organization has a security control implemented to reduce security incidents


Causes a good deal of user friction

Some productivity loss due to the control

Is not free: annual cost of \$15m (SaaS subscription, maintenance, internal staffing)

Risk team: how does removing the control affect our risk exposure?

Increase risk: example



Perform 2 analyses

- Current risk
- Forecast risk if controls are removed

Increase risk: example



Conclusions

Current risk is below our tolerance, so we have room to maneuver

The probability of losses exceeding \$40m goes from 5% to 12%

This change will net \$15m in savings annually

If we need more data to make a decision, we can price out productivity gains from the change

Final Thoughts

Consider FAIR at least for your huge existential risks – big strategic unlock

Subjective data (human judgement) isn't bad

FAIR allows for different kinds of decisions in cyber security

Use the data you have



